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Potent Relatives. Ethnic Relations and  
Exclusive Rights in Kalimantan 
Laurens Bakker 
Introduction 
The regulating agency of official law, by which I mean law promulgated by a 
government which derives its authority from the state it represents, is not 
uncontested.1 In most states the medium of law is applied to provide official 
norms of (il)legality to society yet, as is a central theme in anthropology of law, 
other normative systems may exist in addition, or even in competition, with this 
official normativity. Law gains meaning from what it authorises as much as 
from what it forbids, making law and its negation opposites that define and 
construct one another (Anders and Nuijten, 2007:12). As the rule of law 
principle maintains that none is above the law (cf. Carothers, 1998:96-97), 
governments included, control over which norms are law as well as over their 
actual meaning are highly valuable strategic assets in power struggles. 
In this paper I analyse the discourse used by an indigenous group – Dayak- 
in the Indonesian province of East Kalimantan to substantiate customary claims 
to natural resources.2 This discourse refers to multiple legalities – official law 
as well as indigenous norms – and is sustained by references to Indonesian 
nationalism and regional community. Although these varied factors seem in-
compatible, they carry a long way in practice. As legal arguments are entwined 
with local needs and ethnic interests, unravelling this Gordian knot is a daunt-
ing task for those government officials that have to deal with the claims. A 
purely legal analysis hence is not sufficient in settling the matter. My interest 
lies with the conscious and precise mobilisation of Dayak indigeneity in 
arguing exclusive rights and maintaining the continued validity of norms 
alternative to those of official law. I maintain that these appeals to indigenous 
norms and the normative plurality that is invoked are politicized in a way that 
exceeds the direct needs of most of the people in whose name they are fielded, 
                                                          
 
1  Research for this paper was carried out as part of the Indonesian-Dutch INDIRA 
project. I would like to thank Fakultas Kehutanan of Universitas Mulawarman, 
Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia, Tropenbos International Indonesia and the 
Van Vollenhoven Institute of Leiden University for their kind support of the 
research. Financial support was provided by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts 
and Sciences (KNAW), the Treub Foundation, the Netherlands Foundation for the 
Advancement of Tropical Research (WOTRO) and the Adatrechtstichting 
2  Kalimantan is the Indonesian part of the island of Borneo. It consists of the 
provinces of Central-, West-, South-, and East Kalimantan. 
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but that serves to effectively secure a zone of autonomy. Nonetheless this is a 
dangerous strategy to follow. Ethnic relations form the fibres that make up the 
Dayak cords in the knot, but what keeps them from untwining? Is ethnic unity a 
strong enough base to successfully claim exclusive rights and the validity of 
private norms in twenty-first century Indonesia? How do Dayak get away with 
such claims in the national context? My main question in this paper thus is how 
the strategic mobilisation and deployment of Dayak ethnicity in the obtainment 
of exclusive rights functions, and what its results are. The issue whether such 
deployment is in accordance with the law or can be seen as ‘just’ forms the 
broader background against which the subject is considered.  
Claiming Dayak ethnic rights is a strategy that balances Indonesian national 
unity, indigenous rights and local interests. Official law is, as may be expected 
in a nation of which the government claims to adhere to the rule of law, the 
main regulating agency as far as the state is concerned. The above questions 
thus need to be considered from a socio-political as well as from a legal per-
spective. My point in undertaking such an exercise is to explore the relatedness 
of these two and the dependence of local juridical circumstances on the balance 
of power in politics.  
Research Methodology 
This paper is based on field research carried out in a series of visits to West and 
East Kalimantan between 2004 and 2009. This research was concerned with the 
legal aspects of land tenure as well as with the socio-political dimension in 
which such tenure was to be realized. The two differed markedly, and showed 
that especially at lower levels of the administration political influence and 
social power were major factors that could overshadow official law. Most of 
the data used for this paper was collected through semi-structured interviews 
with a diverse range of respondents; farmers, regional and provincial adminis-
tration and police officials, NGO activists, indigenous leaders and judges. 
People were quite willing to share their thoughts, hopes and annoyances regard-
ing Indonesia’s legal system, its government, society and future. Yet what 
people say and what they do can be different. Hence the research included long 
periods of participant observation. For the cases discussed here this meant 
attending demonstrations, NGO and Dayak organization meetings, sitting in on 
discussions between Dayak spokespersons and government officials, and 
spending days in the offices of both, observing and discussing their courses of 
action. The fieldwork was complemented by keeping an eye on regional 
newspapers, a major source of information for all parties involved, and by 
reading government reports and local Dayak magazines. 
The Limits of Indonesian Unity  
During the New Order, the regime led by President Suharto that ruled Indonesia 
for over three decades, the metaphor of the family was regularly applied in 
referring to the nation. The New Order regime was an autocracy, albeit one in 
which the population was likened to one big family headed by ‘father’ Suharto. 
Gaining influence and power meant gaining Suharto’s favour, and Suharto was 
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careful in selecting his confidants. The ‘family’ was ruled with a strong hand as 
the regime maintained its power base through the careful distribution of favours 
to win and maintain the loyalty of key sections of the administrative and 
military elite. Suharto allowed these to benefit economically from their loyalty, 
making the New Order a strong example of Weberian patrimonialism (Webber, 
2006:409) as well as reminiscent of a family business in which not all siblings 
have equal positions. The patrimonial pyramid, of which Suharto formed the 
pinnacle, comprised the higher classes and elites throughout the nation. The 
middle class was divided in groups reinforcing the authoritarian character of the 
administration and others favouring a more liberal democratic leadership. A 
large and expanding working class supported the pyramid, and witnessed the 
nation’s growing wealth with interest. As reforms for this class were piecemeal 
and slow, analysts believed it likely that working class discontent rather than 
middle class mobilisation would grow to demand a change of regime (Hadiz, 
1994; Berger, 1997). 
Suharto was often accosted by his nickname 'bapak' (father) in the media 
and at public gatherings. He and his family directly symbolised the unity and 
harmony of the Indonesian population. Yet the image was not without its 
weaknesses. The president's biological children were famous throughout the 
nation for their unscrupulous abuse of their position and regarded with 
ambivalence – at best – by the vast numbers of symbolic siblings that did not 
share in the family's wealth. The metaphor of the presidential family as a 
symbol for the nation took on an eerie predictive side in 1996 when ibu 
(mother) Tien, Suharto's wife, died of a heart attack. According to persistent, if 
unconfirmed, rumours, her condition was brought about by witnessing a violent 
quarrel over competing businesses between two of her sons. Yet another 
version of her death, discussed widely on the internet, has it that these sons 
were about to go at each other with guns. Their mother stepped between them 
and got shot by accident. My point here is not to determine the exact nature of 
Ibu Tien’s death; it is to consider the symbolism of the violence which popular 
opinion holds to have torn apart the one family representing the harmony and 
unity of all of Indonesia’s population. Suharto, now a widower, no longer 
headed a family that could represent the unity of the nation (cf. Suryakusuma, 
1996). The family was damaged, possibly from the inside out. If even the 
president’s children could have gone as far as killing their own mother, what 
was to maintain the grand family of the nation? Why indeed would not a new 
generation disperse with the concept of a symbolic national family and shift 
their focus towards their actual siblings?  
Indonesia, as a state, consists of a plurality of ethnic groups with highly 
quite diverse languages, cultures and religions that are mainly united through a 
collective shared past as the Dutch East Indies. National unity and identity are 
largely based on this common past and on the fight for independence, and are 
largely considered as failing to attain the same binding powers as ethnic and 
regional affiliations. When Anderson (1991) proposed to consider nations as 
imagined communities – imagined because one does not know all other 
members of one’s nation in person, community is not part of daily experience – 
he frequently referred to Indonesian nation-building for illustrations. The 
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diversity of languages was overcome by the introduction of a new, national 
language (Bahasa Indonesia). Differences between religions and ideologies 
were solved by formulating the state philosophy of Pancasila as the nation’s 
supreme ideological base, yet creating a uniform legal framework proved more 
problematic. Groups throughout Indonesia place emphasis on the validity of 
local custom (adat) as a source of rights. In the colonial past, adat was 
officially considered as valid law for the native population in most private law 
affairs. Non-natives were governed by other, non-adat, legal systems. Upon 
independence, this official legal pluralism was replaced by a single system of 
national law in which the status of adat became mainly symbolic and subjected 
to general interest as define by government. In practice adat norms remained 
valid throughout rural areas and a type of unofficial legal pluralism ensued (see 
Burns, 2004:249-251; Hooker, 1978:20-29). As we shall see below, rights 
derived from state law and adat interests frequently opposed one another in 
affairs pertaining to land and natural resources, giving rise to grievances in 
those population groups that maintained the validity of their adat rights. From 
1999 onwards, reform of the national administration and far-reaching changes 
in government provided such groups with opportunities to mobilise their 
claims.  
Reform 
When the Southeast Asian economic crisis of the second half of the nineties hit 
Indonesia, it severely impacted the dispersal of economic favours on which 
New Order power was based. Support for the regime dwindled as aspiring 
members of the elite, politicians and high ranking army officials began to 
consider alternative power constellations. Moreover, large parts of the 
population – the poor who were directly affected by the crisis, intellectuals and 
social leaders critical of the unequal and authoritarian New Order rule – began 
to demand changes. Demands turned to large scale protests and riots and when 
it became clear, in 1998, that Suharto no longer had the full support of the 
military and political elites, he stepped down as President of Indonesia.  
Suharto’s successor, vice-president Yusuf Habibie, was faced with the 
daunting task of keeping the Indonesian state together. The metaphor of the 
nation as a family was shelved in favour of no-nonsense political and 
administrative emancipation of the Indonesian population. In two 1998 laws 
known as the ‘regional autonomy laws’,3 far-reaching administrative powers 
were decentralised from the national level to that of regional government.4 In 
addition, government control over the establishment of political parties and 
over the press was considerably lessened.  
                                                          
 
3  Law 22 of 1999 on Regional Government and Law 25 of 1999 on the Fiscal Balance 
Between the Regions and the Centre. 
4  Indonesia’s administrative levels consist of the national level, below it the provinces, 
and below these the regions. At the time of writing some 450 regions existed (see 
http://www.bps.go.id/ for the current state of affairs).  
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The regional autonomy laws preserved the unity of the nation as they provided 
regional governments with far-reaching authorities. Article 7 of Law 22 decrees 
that regional government will not have authority over foreign politics, defence, 
security, the judiciary, religion and fiscal matters, but the law does not contain 
a positive definition of the new regional authorities.5 These vague descriptions 
of authorities led to a wide diversity in interpretation and application through-
out Indonesia’s regions. Whereas the substance of the regional autonomy laws 
has since been elaborated in various presidential decrees as well as a set of 
revision laws, weak central government control over regional administrations 
allowed ample space for local power holders to ensure that implementation 
suits their interests (cf. Schulte Nordholt and Van Klinken, 2007:11-15; 
McCarthy, 2004: 1199-1201). Revised versions of the regional autonomy laws 
where promulgated in 2004.6 Whereas these laws contained more precise 
delineations of the authorities of regional government and clearly defined a 
more prominent role for the provincial level, they also stipulated that in 
addition to the members of the regional parliament, the head of regional 
government henceforth was to be elected directly by the population.7 This is an 
important change as it established a direct connection between the district head 
and the population. In East Kalimantan this made for candidates waging 
extensive campaigns and establishing far-reaching cooperation with local 
interest groups. Popular influence was entering politics. 
The Rise of Ethnic Rights 
Indonesian law recognizes the existence of adat claims, notably in relation to 
land and other natural resources. The Basic Agrarian Law, for instance, men-
tions adat claims as potentially valid rights to land, although various limiting 
conditions do exist (see Haverfield, 1999:51-4). Observance of adat rights, 
however, hardly goes beyond lip service. National legislation either contains 
references that do not have consequences, or leave adat rights conspicuously 
absent in laws where definition of its legal validity would appear essential.8 
That is not to say that adat does not hold sway. In large parts of the archipelago 
access to land, forest, water and so on is arranged based on local adat. State 
administration has never provided a system that satisfactorily could replace 
local custom, and its representatives have never been able to instil state law 
throughout the nation. In many areas, therefore, adat rules exist as an altern-
ative normative system to official law. 
Under the New Order adat – in the meaning of tradition – was incorporated 
in the regime’s appreciation of Indonesia’s cultural diversity. Cultural and 
ethnic traditions were highly appreciated provided they remained folkloristic 
(see Acciaioli, 1985:162). Song and dance were fine, but politicisation or any 
                                                          
 
5  For a more extensive discussion, see for instance Suharyo (2000:8-14). 
6  Laws 32 and 33 of 2004. 
7  The regional head used to be appointed by the regional parliament. 
8  See Bedner and Van Huis (2008) for an overview of the position of adat claims in 
official legislation. 
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other type of mobilisation was sternly discouraged. The perception of adat as a 
source of rights was sternly discouraged, even insofar as national law contained 
instructions to take adat claims into account. Enforcement of national law was 
limited and coloured by the interests of the regime and, as MacIntyre (1991:17) 
notes, ‘largely unfettered by societal interest’. Results of appeals to official law 
were unpredictable. 
The end of the New Order regime brought the social role of adat claims to 
the fore with a vengeance. Throughout the nation communities maintained 
adat-based claims to lands which had been taken into use for regime-sponsored 
projects.  
In opposite direction to government decentralisation, the adat movement 
centralised on the Jakarta-based National Alliance of Adat Communities 
(Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, AMAN), an organisation which strongly 
refers to a discourse equating the position of Indonesian adat communities 
(masyarakat adat) to those of indigenous communities worldwide (cf. Li, 
2000:155-157; Budiman, 2005:3-9). Although this is a strategy that ensures 
international support its effect is questionable; the government’s position is that 
all Indonesians are indigenous and therefore no exclusive rights can exist.9  
Yet not all groups making claims based on adat do so in reference to the 
nationwide adat movement. With considerable administrative authority largely 
beyond the control of the centre at the regional level of government, arguing 
adat rights at this level is a strongly favoured alternative (cf. Henley and 
Davidson, 2007; Acciaioli, 2009:94-97). In the view of Indonesia that takes 
Java (more specifically Jakarta) as the centre of the nation, many regions within 
Indonesia are peripheral or semi-peripheral. During the New Order this meant 
that the regions acted upon the central regime’s instructions (Connor and 
Vickers, 2003:156-157). Now, however, the regions dispose of considerable 
space for local initiative, including matters of adat. The close proximity of 
administrative authorities to the region’s population, their dependency on local 
support for their position and the ensuing possibility of have members of local 
ethnic minorities forming significant blocks in the regional administration 
makes that ‘keeping things in the family’ can be a far more efficient course of 
action to get adat claims and other local interests officially supported.10 Such 
localism takes in the indigenous argument as well. ‘Putra daerah’ (sons of the 
soil) status is often fielded in support of adat claims. The claimants are not 
interested in some form of indigenous status on the national level; they 
emphasize their indigeneity at the local level and accost the regional or 
provincial governments. West Sumatra, for instance, is a well-researched case 
in which the rise to prominence of the ethnic Minangkabau majority in the local 
administration (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 2001) and attempts to 
                                                          
 
9  See the explanation of Indonesia’s representative at the United Nations on his 
country’s vote on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples at 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/ga10612.doc.htm. 
10  See for instance Avonius (2003) on events in Lombok, and Schulte Nordholt’s 
(2007) study on Bali after the fall of Suharto. 
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implement official observance of the Minangkabau adat property system (F. 
and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 2004) are evident examples. In Nunukan, East 
Kalimantan, the Dayak Lundayeh have obtained official recognition of their 
adat-based communal land claim, while authority in affairs pertaining to this 
land has been vested in local adat leaders (see Bakker, 2007:166-168). 
Likewise, Central Kalimantan’s provincial government followed bloody ethnic 
fighting between local Dayak and Madurese migrants – which ended in a 
decisive Dayak victory – with legislation showing a strong bias towards Dayak 
adat rights.11  
Ethnic groups attempting to obtain governmental recognition of adat rights 
– a matter with a certain, if poorly determined, foundation in official law – thus 
approach the issue in various ways. A major strategy is by referring to the 
general, international discourse of indigenous peoples rights that appeals to the 
morality of the state and that is aligned with civil action groups, NGOs and 
other groups willing to openly criticize the government. Another approach sees 
ethnic groups attempting to harness government authority to further their goals, 
rather than following a strategy of open opposition. In various regions the 
validity of adat rules is boosted by recognition and support through official 
regulations, yet raises questions as well. Is the recognition of adat a valid line 
of action for a democracy reinventing itself after decades of authoritarianism? 
If the New Order regime maintained control through the appropriation of 
national law, than how does the rise to the fore of local adat systems differ 
from such exclusivist normativity?   
Defining Dayak 
‘Dayak’, as an ethnic category, originated as a pejorative term used by Bornean 
coastal dwellers to refer to interior and upriver pagans. It was appropriated by 
the Dutch and English colonial administrations respectively (King and Wilder, 
2003:209). By the time of Malaysian and Indonesian Independence, the term 
was firmly in use as an ethnic and religious distinction that designated the non-
Muslim, non-Malay original inhabitants of Borneo, who generally live in the 
interior of the island (cf. King, 1993:29-30). The foreign origin of the term is 
illustrated in Sellato’s (2002:3-10) work on ‘Dayak Cultures’. Apart from 
incidental generic usage, Sellato shows how those considered to be ‘Dayak’ 
distinguish among themselves dozens of ethnic groups and sub-groups, each 
having its own proper name, who often do not see themselves as related to one 
another in any way. 
                                                          
 
11  After plans to promulgate official legislation prohibiting Madurese to live in Central 
Kalimantan proved impossible to carry out under Indonesian law. See for instance 
the entries in the Dayak blog www.e-borneo.com of 14 September 2001. The 
resulting legislation (Provincial Regulation of Central Kalimantan 9/2001) makes it 
clear that all in the province must respect local adat and follow the instructions of 
adat leaders, and that the adat in question is Dayak adat. 
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The term had derogatory qualities. Among coastal dwellers Dayaks were 
known for their fearsome half-naked appearance and their head-hunting raids, 
the gruesome trophies of which were retained to adorn their longhouses in the 
forest. ‘Dayak’ therefore traditionally evokes associations of backwardness, 
dirtiness, violence and barbarism (Peluso, 2003:206-207). Missionaries added 
their bit to Dayak identity by converting the Dayak majority to various creeds 
of Christianity – from staunch fundamentalists to more syncretic versions in 
which Christianity merged with indigenous beliefs. 
It was (and is) possible for Dayak to shed Dayak identity. Dayak can 
become Muslim, take a Muslim name and associate with Malays – a process 
known as masuk Malayu (to enter Malayness). Over time they will be con-
sidered Malay, rather than Dayak (Sellato, 1989:20). Many of the Brunei 
Malay, for instance, originate from the indigenous population inhabiting 
Borneo’s western coast who joined with Muslim settlers (King, 1993:31). 
Masuk Malayu had its advantages for those Dayak wanting to rise in the Malay-
dominated civil service and government of Indonesia’s Kalimantan, or 
otherwise become more fully accepted into the coastal societies.12 Yet, as 
Tanasaldy (2007:361-369) and Widen (2002:116-120) show, from the early 
1990s onwards and following the fall of Suharto and reformasi, Dayak 
throughout Kalimantan – but notably in West and Central Kalimantan – gained 
in ethnic confidence. This culminated in, among others, the dramatic Dayak-
Madurese fighting in those provinces. Newly found confidence encouraged 
converted Dayak Muslims to hold on to or even revert back to their ethnic 
identity rather than become Malay (Chalmers, 2006:19-22). 
Dayak Unity 
The June 2007 inflight magazine of Garuda Indonesia, Indonesia’s national 
carrier, is a special issue on the culture of the main indigenous group of 
Kalimantan, the Dayak. In one of the articles, a report on the Dayak Isen 
Mulang festival in the province of Central Kalimantan, Sari Widiati (2007:22) 
writes:  
‘Even though the festival presented only a small part of the tremendous range of 
Dayak culture, including how the Dayak have acculturated with newer arrivals in the 
region, it brought together people from around the province to gather and compete in 
a sportsmanlike way, displaying the ‘never give up’ spirit that is the meaning of the 
phrase Isen Mulang.’. 
                                                          
 
12  Christian Dayak working with the local government in Pontianak (West 
Kalimantan), at the provincial governor’s office of East Kalimantan and at a number 
of Kalimantese universities pointed out to me that senior functions were always 
filled by Muslims, not by Dayaks. They experienced their ethnicity and religion as 
factors limiting their career possibilities. However, in districts with a more or less 
equal division between Dayak and non-Dayak, such as Kutai Barat or Nunukan 
(both in East Kalimantan), a similar division among ethnic lines of positions within 
the local bureaucracy guaranteed stability within society. 
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No doubt the festival was a joyful occasion. Yet the illustrating photographs of 
men shooting blowpipes and dancing with mandau (a Dayak sword) will 
remind others of the 1997, 1999 and 2001 unrests in West and Central 
Kalimantan, when Dayak and Malayu warriors forcibly evicted Madurese 
migrants, leaving hundreds dead. Reasons stated for this outbreak of violence 
are diverse. Dayak apologists such as Giring (2004) and Widen (2002) 
emphasise continued Madurese crime, general rudeness and violence; not just 
against Dayak but against all ethnic groups in Kalimantan. As the local 
indigenous group, the Dayak were the tuan tanah (literally ‘lords of the land’, 
but also meaning hosts) to the other groups. A host politely forgives well-
meaning guests an unintended misstake, the apologists argue, but after years of 
patiently enduring Madurese misbehaviour the Dayak had no other choice but 
to clear their lands of these criminals. Yet others see a more profound 
background. Davidson (2003:63, 65-67) points out that Dayak-Madurese 
conflict has a long history in Kalimantan. Davidson discerns economic interests 
as well as attempts by both groups to become influential political entities, and 
concludes that an internalised ‘us’ versus ‘them’ is a strong part of the 
conflicts’ origins. De Jonge and Nooteboom (2006:471-472), two researchers 
approaching the issue with considerable attention for the Madurese perspective, 
point to similar issued by emphasizing competition over resources as well as 
elites’ attempts to obtain powerful positions in the post-Suharto political 
climate. Achieving major political power in a competitive society required a 
defeated or subdued opposition; a role for which long-standing enmity ideally 
positioned the Madurese.     
Yet in East Kalimantan, which also has Dayak and Madurese groups among 
its population, no such conflicts occurred. The violence that took place in 
Central and West Kalimantan was not denounced or opposed by East 
Kalimantan Dayak groups. A policy developed among East Kalimantan Dayak 
organisations to condemn ethnic violence in general, but present it as a realistic 
threat, after which they would state their willingness and ability to protect East 
Kalimantan society from its threat. This approach served to improve the local 
position of Dayak groups to match the level of Dayak power in West and 
Central Kalimantan. As a result, the political importance of such organisations 
and Dayak standing in general increased in East Kalimantan. Real and visible 
relations to the victorious Dayak fighters in other provinces was essential to 
substantiate this rise in prestige. 
The Rise of Pan-Dayakism 
Ambitious elements within the Dayak movements aim to mobilise a pan-Dayak 
identity that unites Dayak groups into a coherent social force vis-à-vis non-
Dayak (Thung et al., 2004) and, when deemed necessary, against the state. 
Education, telephone, the internet and other modern means of communication 
enable such developments. The need for Dayak cohesion, its supporters feel, is 
bigger than ever. Government development plans hold little space for adat 
rights, while the numbers of non-Dayak living on Borneo put pressure on 
Dayak lands and traditions. The grounds for pan-Dayakism thus are in place: 
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threats to Dayak cultures, livelihoods and territories. A number of potentially 
unifying arguments can hence be distinguished. 
First is the ethnic argument, which presupposes the existence of a coherent 
Dayak identity that is indigenous to Borneo. Asides from various other 
indigenous groups – such as Malay in West Kalimantan and the Banajarese in 
the south – many of Borneo’s inhabitants are immigrants who have settled in 
Kalimantan, often without indigenous consent. In many areas, migrants are so 
numerous that Dayak and other indigenous groups have become minorities, and 
fear that what is left of their culture and lands will be swallowed up by new 
arrivals and government development. Yet, Dayak activists argue, they are the 
Putra Daerah, the ‘sons of the soil’. They belong to the place, contrary to 
others, and as sons from this same mother are related by a kinship that goes 
beyond regular bloodlines.  
Second is the legal argument, which concerns illegal or unjust use of Dayak 
lands. As many Dayak live in rural areas with limited access to education, 
general ideas about law and legality are largely formed by local normativity, 
generally based on adat. Legitimate actions undertaken under national law 
which negatively influence local arrangements – for instance migrant resettle-
ment or the construction of plantations – are frequently considered as illegal or 
at least unjust practices. Such actions are seen as abuses of state power con-
trolled by an abstract elite of (non-Dayak) state officials. As a direct result the 
legal argument sees Dayak lands as illegally limited by the state, personified by 
non-Dayak migrants and mining, logging or plantation companies.  
Closely related to the legal argument is a third, economic, issue. Over the 
past decades, the central government granted (inter)national companies permis-
sion to log Kalimantan’s extensive forests. Although these forests were subject 
to adat rights, profits failed to trickle down to the Dayak groups living in the 
areas. In addition, the workers carrying out the actual logging are usually 
immigrants brought in for the job, offering few local Dayaks the chance of a 
job with the companies. For many Dayak groups the forests provide additional 
produce through hunting and gathering, and are the main land available for 
laying out new gardens and rice fields. The type of rice farming conducted in 
much of Borneo’s interior is dry rice farming, or shifting cultivation. After 
using a plot for one or two years it must remain fallow for at least five years to 
recuperate. Fields are cleared on a yearly base in the forest, thus making it 
necessary for a small group to have access to a relatively large plot of forest in 
order to sustain itself. After logging many forest areas have been transformed 
into large monoculture enterprises of rubber or oil palm, thus limiting the land 
and forest available for shifting cultivators. Many local protests were staged, 
although few were successful. A higher level of mobilization, it is felt, might 
put more weight in the scale and address these significant violations of adat.  
Nonetheless, ambitions to mobilise a pan-Dayak identity are hampered by 
the inherent high level of abstraction this requires. Most rural Dayak first 
consider themselves to be part of a specific sub-group rather than of a united 
Dayak whole. The numerous Dayak groups are divided by different languages, 
customs, religions and a plethora of diverse local adat rules, with many groups 
having histories of communal warfare. In addition, the political make-up of 
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Borneo means that Dayak groups are citizens of three different nations – 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brunei – while they do not constitute a majority in any 
of them. Developments in West and Central Kalimantan have shown Dayak 
groups to unite in dealing with other ethnic groups, but this appears to be 
brought about by opportunism and personal ambitions rather than by conscious 
planning.  
The uniting abilities of Dayak ethnicity thus face problems similar to those 
of Indonesian national identity. However, whereas the metaphor of the family 
sat problematic within the context of the nation, it holds more validity in 
uniting Dayak. Actual inter-group relations and marriages are quite common 
and the increasing presence of non-Dayak interests on Borneo provides an 
actual factor to unite against. Dayak identity, contrary to national identity, thus 
gains strong meaning by contrasting it with a concrete and nearby other group. 
As a consequence, the discourse of Dayak identity thus contains strong drives 
going against the discourse of national unity. The main issue, then, is whether 
Dayak unity has stronger uniting powers than the ‘national family’ does. 
East Kalimantan Dayak Politics 
East Kalimantan Dayak organisations actively ally with West and Central 
Kalimantan Dayak groups in projecting the potential of united Dayak to East 
Kalimantan’s government and society. The organisations’ existence is legitim-
ised through appeals to customary or indigenous rights as well as by references 
to political muscle, for these broad alliances claim thousands of members. 
Possibly due to this need for association, East Kalimantan has some highly 
developed ‘Pan-Dayak’ groups; notably the DADK and the PDKT. The Dayak 
Adat Council of Kalimantan (Dewan Adat Dayak se-Kalimantan, hereafter 
DADK) is based in Balikpapan and regularly fields Dayak adat as an argument 
to counter or influence the provincial government. The DADK has considerable 
success in obtaining indemnifications for usage of Dayak adat lands from the 
government or from companies, and ensures a Dayak voice in the province’s 
economic policies. This includes decisions as to the locations of new 
plantations and mines, as well as to the percentage of local workers that 
companies will be made to hire. Locating new projects on adat land and 
reserving jobs for local Dayak workers are strong courses of action, as they 
favour the area’s economy. However, claiming the validity of adat and 
legitimising the DADK’s position as an organisation empowered by adat 
authority only works if sufficient individuals support this thesis. In order to 
convincingly argue the legitimacy of their arguments, the DADK hence needs 
actual Dayak support. The organisation mobilises along such bonds as unite the 
Dayak groups to obtain the numbers, community, ethnicity and religion, as well 
as through the notions of justice of Dayak legal consciousness. Legitimacy 
must be established vis-a-vis the government and the non-Dayak population, 
yet requires confirmation from the large and diverse mass of Dayak 
communities. However, the accessible level of regional government offers 
ample opportunities to claim representative powers without the need to deliver 
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actual proof. Connections in government, military or police circles can be of 
greater importance than actual grassroots support (e.g. Bakker 2009).  
The second organisation is the East Kalimantan Dayak Association 
(Persekutuhan Dayak Kalimantan Timur, or PDKT). Established in the late 
nineteen nineties, this is the oldest Dayak organisation in the province. The 
PDKT lobbies for proportional Dayak representation in the administration and 
in government and has established close links with officials at the provincial 
level. The PDKT’s situation is a strong example of the type of internal 
problems that Dayak organisations must deal with. Schiller (2007:70-75) 
describes how during a major PDKT seminar in 1999, participants’ diversity in 
religion, adat and even in cultural symbols were problematised to the extent 
that they prevented the formulation of a baseline of common Dayak interest and 
the design of an organisational coat of arms. No Dayak group would go so far 
as to leave the PDKT as the organisation was the main Dayak vehicle in the 
province at the time, but inter-group rivalry and distrust discouraged 
commitment and prevented the foundation of an authoritative organisation. 
Nonetheless, the meeting managed to empower its board to engage with 
relevant political issues in the province.  
In 2003, the PDKT board asked the Dayak to vote for a specific pair of 
candidates – Suwarna and Ngayoh – in the provincial governor and vice-
governor elections. The pair won, putting the PDKT in a good position with the 
provincial authorities but, paradoxically, in a poor light with its young 
supporters. Many young urban Dayak, fresh out of the protests and turmoil that 
ended the New Order regime, considered a close link to government officials 
too similar to the patrimonialism they had just protected against. Moreover, 
they argued, such links made it impossible for the PDKT to speak out on issues 
that were crucial to its grassroots support, but sensitive to the government 
(Thung et.al. 2004:59-63). Urged on by these urban activists smaller regional 
Dayak organisations began to oppose the influence of the PDKT. They main-
tained that the organisation had become estranged from its rural roots by 
engaging with the government rather than supporting the Dayak subsistence 
farmers affected by government land usage. The PDKT board attempted to 
counter this development by inviting regional Dayak leaders and adat 
specialists on its board or in its advisory panel, yet to its young critics this 
strategy again brought associations of New Order policies, which also 
frequently used incorporation as a means to silence opponents, to mind. 
Internal Division 
In 2001 the DADK was established. Among its founding members were the 
rector of Balikpapan University, the founder of Balikpapan’s chapter of the 
Evangelical Gereja Injil Church, and an influential adat leader of the Dayak 
Lundayeh who also was a retired, but still connected, police officer. Working 
through the church, the student community, and the network of adat leaders, 
the DADK swiftly became well-known throughout the province. Initially the 
DADK and PDKT existed side by side. The DADK focussed on solving issues 
among the Dayak population according to Dayak adat and did not involve itself 
with district politics. However, as many of the issues they had to deal with 
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involved government authorities, contacts between government officials and 
the DADK became frequent.13 The DADK explicitly referred to the prominent 
violence in West and Central Kalimantan and their abilities to control tempers 
in East Kalimantan. This made East Kalimantan authorities decide to involve 
the adat-touting DADK, rather than the less outspoken PDKT, in mediating 
conflicts. The DADK carefully managed its image and contacts. In 2004, the 
chair of the DADK board had a meeting with then President Megawati 
Soekarnoputri, during which the nature of Dayak identity and the commitment 
of the DADK to the unity of the Indonesian state were discussed. In 2005 a 
similar visit was paid to her successor President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. 
Both occasions where covered in East Kalimantan media, ensuring the DADK 
of a reputation as an organisation that had contacts in the highest regions. East 
Kalimantan police and military already had begun making incidental request for 
DADK mediation in potential conflicts, Dayak parties now followed suit as 
well. 
In 2004, the DADK board decided to honour its name and formally 
establish its Kalimantan-wide scale. Under the chairmanship of the board, 
delegations from Dayak adat organisations from all four Indonesian Bornean 
provinces joined to discuss issues related to the Dayak community in a formal 
conference in Balikpapan in November 2004. The meeting encountered 
problems similar to those which Schiller observed at the 1999 PDKT meeting. 
Again the participants’ cultural and religious diversity, as well as the problem 
of suitable symbols and the number of each group’s representatives dominated 
the discussions. However, East and Central Kalimantan’s representatives had 
already reached agreements in a series of meeting preceding the conference. 
Conference participants received a list of decisions which the board proposed 
on the composition of the DADK (including deciding the members of the 
board), and combined Central and East Kalimantan support ensured a swift 
passing. 
A main obstacle was the absence of West Kalimantan’s representatives 
whose flight had been gravely delayed, and who only arrived halfway through 
the meeting. West Kalimantan’s contingent sought – and received – a review of 
passed decisions, thus distinctly showing the world the lack of Dayak unity.  
Such a lack was also apparent in the absence of a fair number of local or 
regional Dayak organisations. Board members of the PDKT had cautioned 
against joining the DADK since the organisation could destabilize Dayak-
government relations. Critics claimed that the PDKT board simply feared to be 
eclipsed by the DADK, but other large Dayak organisations shared the PDKT’s 
reservations. The general secretary of the powerful National Dayak Adat 
Community (Masyarakat Adat Dayak Nasional) from Central Kalimantan had 
joined the DADK’s founding board, yet the influential leader of the National 
Dayak Adat Council (Majelis Adat Dayak Nasional), Agustin Teras Narang – a 
                                                          
 
13  Cases included disputes over land, natural resources, and the matter whether non-
Dayak should be allowed (or forced) to settle disputes with Dayak according to 
Dayak adat.  
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member of the national parliament and a heavyweight in Central Kalimantan’s 
Dayak society – refused to join a potential competitor to his own organisation. 
The founding board took great care to emphasize the organisation’s all-Dayak 
character. A new chair originating from West Kalimantan was elected and the 
organisation of a follow-up conference in that province was planned.  
External Unity 
Whereas the PDKT largely refrained from references to Dayak as ‘family’ or 
‘relatives’ and limited itself to speaking of ‘the Dayak’ without explaining who 
they meant by this, the DADK restyled kinship-symbolism to fit the Dayak 
imagery. Rather than as siblings, the Dayak were depicted as a ‘tribe’ (suku) 
that consists of various sub-tribes. Dayak relations were not those of a ‘family’ 
but rather resembled those of a Dayak long-house, of which part of the 
population would move away when too many inhabitants had to share the same 
accommodation and found a new long-house. The houses were independent, 
but would maintain relational ties. The constellation thus was far looser than 
that of a family, but nonetheless implies relatedness vis-à-vis the rest of 
Indonesian society. Inter-Dayak relations connected all Dayak communities, 
but not within the straight, authoritarian framework of the ‘family’ metaphor. 
The ‘tribe’ and ‘long-house’ symbolism also contained a message to the nation: 
the Dayak were part of the Indonesian state as fellow-citizens and neighbours, 
but not as children subservient to non-Dayak parents.   
The DADK 2004 conference showcased a new addition to Dayak 
movements that emphasised this independence; five men dressed in military 
camouflage outfits wearing red berets guarding the entrance and exit doors of 
the meeting room. Although unarmed, their authority was clear. These five 
were the first members of the Kalimantan Dayak Adat Defence Command 
(Komando Pertahanan Adat Dayak Kalimantan). A group established to safe-
guard and regulate adat related meetings, to police the Dayak adat community 
and discipline perpetrators of adat rules. A large founding ceremony for this 
group, which would resort under the command of the DADK, was announced 
for the next year. In the light of the violent developments in West and Central 
Kalimantan, one would expect the Adat Command to be met with suspicion 
from the authorities. This hardly was the case. A day before the conference, the 
head vicar of the Samarinda episcopacy publicly urged the DADK chair to fight 
ignorance, neglect and poverty. The chair replied that the Adat Command 
would have an important role in controlling Dayak in case of social unrest and 
thus contribute to the safeguarding of the peace in East Kalimantan. Basing 
themselves on this statement, the provincial government and provincial police 
forces stated their support for the Dayak Command.14 Whereas the Adat 
                                                          
 
14  The official founding ceremony of the KPADK in Balikpapan in February 2006, was 
attended by representatives of the city council and the mayor, the provincial army 
command and provincial police forces, all congratulating the DADK on the estab-
lishment of this security wing. In Balikpapan alone the KPADK had 400 enlisted 
members.  
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Command became a social force in conflicts throughout East Kalimantan and 
Dayak prominence was clearly on the rise, the link with government was 
steadily maintained. 
In 2006 things took a sour turn when West Kalimantan Dayak leaders 
decided to start yet another all-Dayak organisation and declined to continue 
working within the framework of the DADK. The West Kalimantan Dayak 
argued that the DADK had grown too close to the government, and could no 
longer be seen as an independent organisation with Dayak interests at heart. 
Division threatened, and came to the fore in 2008. In a new round of elections 
for East Kalimantan’s governor and vice-governor, the DADK and the PDKT – 
which was supported by the new West Kalimantan organisation –, urged their 
supporters to vote for different pairs of candidates. The Dayak vote was 
splintered and both organisations’ aspiration of getting a Dayak governor in 
office failed to materialize. 
Negotiating Normativity 
Dayak attempts to ensure recognition of adat normativity and adat-based 
claims by greater Indonesian society are furthered using three quite different 
discourses which are interwoven or separated as circumstances require. First, 
claims are formulated in the universal terms of indigenous rights. The Putra 
Daerah concept strongly appeals to native status; who can be more indigenous 
than those who have the land itself as their (symbolic) parents? The problem 
with this discourse is that it appeals to an international moral argument, but that 
indigenous status is not a concept that brings special status in Indonesian law. 
Claims stand a better chance if they are phrased in terms of official law as well, 
not the least because framing claims in this way implies adherence to the 
official legal system and acceptance of the state as the highest authority 
(Minow, 1997:355). Dayak organisations do not threaten to leave the unity of 
Indonesian society; in fact they submit their grievances to its judgement. But do 
they? In another, more sceptical reading of affairs it can be argued that 
organisations’ strategies concern the harnessing of state authority to serve the 
interests of the Dayak community rather than those of society as a whole. The 
discourse of adherence to the state thus symbolises unity and belonging, but in 
practice it may also signify awareness of modern power-relations and the 
usefulness of control over the state’s authority. The third discourse, which 
engages with national reform, makes use of both these other lines of reasoning. 
It refers to the ousting of corrupt New Order politicians from government and 
their replacement by new officials who will do better in representing the 
interests of society. Dayak organisations publicly support reform politicians 
and presidents, and encourage their membership to vote for reformists. 
Obviously this is also where Dayak opportunities are located. The closed elite 
under the New Order would not allow ethnically inspired and non-aligned 
movements to gain influence at any level of government, whereas reformed 
administrative procedures and makeup of local government allow considerable 
possibilities for Dayak interests to enter the previously reserved circles of 
government officials. 
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Yet these various discourses, essentially three different roads to the same 
destination of greater space for Dayak adat and interests, must take two 
especially problematic aspect in their stride. First is the official legal stance 
towards adat. As stated before, adat rules and claims are mentioned in various 
national laws. Ostensibly as a source of rights, but as Bedner and Van Huis 
conclude (2008:186-190), this is no forgone result. In order to remain valid and 
relevant, customary norms are as much subject to change as national law is. 
The adat of a century ago was not concerned with group rights vis-a-vis the 
state or fellow Indonesians. Nor was there much need or – during the New 
order, space – to rephrase adat rules in the context of the modern state. 
Whereas reform provided the opportunity to demonstrate the continued 
existence and viability of adat rules in communities throughout Indonesia, this 
was often not the adat described in the tomes of the adat scholars of the 
colonial era. Custom and customary authority are vulnerable to abuse.15 A 
strong argument which government authorities frequently field against the 
recognition of adat is that they are dealing with opportunistic ‘invented 
traditions’ (cf. Hobsbawm, 1983:1-2), or with a reification of outdated and 
sidelined customs for the potential benefit of a select group at the expense of a 
majority of the population. Strong arguments against the recognition of adat 
claims, notably when considered from a governmental perspective.  
The second problem is the nature of the two organisations discussed above. 
Both presented themselves as representing Dayak adat interests, yet neither 
engaged adat experts. Whenever either of the two was called upon by the 
government to assist, negotiations would be conducted by board members and 
officials while limiting parties’ involvement to a minimum. If the organisations 
contacted a private party on behalf of a Dayak community or wronged party, 
this would usually be done by a senior member accompanied by a fair number 
of the organisation’s members. A request made to a plantation company for 
financial compensation because of unallowed usage of adat land becomes a sort 
of ‘offer one cannot refuse’ if delivered by thirty uniformed members of the 
adat command. The interpretation of adat displayed is certainly different from 
the open meetings aimed at consensus that are practised in rural villages. What 
goes on here is not unlike the coercion exercised by bands of thugs, or 
blackmail in the name of adat.  
Against these stand arguments that the practice of national law can be as 
unfair and elitist as opponents fear adat to be. The New Order, with its select 
and pragmatic appliance of official law stands as a strong example, while 
Indonesia is probably as famous for tourist-paradise Bali as for the corruption 
of its bureaucracy.16 Both adat and official law have their drawbacks, but adat 
                                                          
 
15  Consider for instance Ubink’s (2008) analysis of the role of chiefs in customary land 
tenure in Ghana, Fraenkel’s (2004) work on the pragmatic and opportunistic dis-
course of custom in the Solomon Islands crisis, or Harnischfeger (2003) on the 
Nigerian Bakassi Boys militia. 
16  For 2008 Indonesia shared position 126 out of 180 (together with Eritrea, Ethiopia, 
Guyana and Honduras) on Transparency International’s corruption perceptions 
index. Scoring a 2,6 out of a maximum of 10. See 
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implies autonomy from the national government that goes beyond what the 
decentralisation legislation allows. Yet as adat requires support from within the 
local administration if it is to operate on a relatively large scale and next to 
official law, strong political and social links between the two are essential.  
Arguing Traditional Values within Modern Indonesia 
Looked at from the perspective of the indigenous peoples’ movement, the nature 
of the Dayak claim is relatively twofold and relatively conventional. First, adat-
derived rights are claimed, which are mainly rights to land, forest and other 
natural resources. Second, honouring of these claims implies the recognition of 
the validity of adat rules by the government, and therefore of a certain degree of 
Dayak autonomy. Whether adat is to be seen as a law in itself or creates a 
measure of autonomy within official law is open for negotiation. Imagined 
results could be the establishment of reserves, or the remittance of indemnifica-
tions for adat resources in use by the state. However, chances of this are slim as 
Indonesian law does not recognise a special ‘indigenous peoples’ status. For the 
law all Indonesians are indigenous, so this argument is likely to fail. 
Reform, with its emphasis on greater democracy, more freedom for the 
population and greater autonomy for the regional level of government, does 
however allow for a greater demonstration of diverse identities within the 
Indonesian nation. Provided that what is asked for is not cast in formulations 
that contravene national law or directly threaten national unity, emphasis on 
regional identity is considered an acceptable and lawful aspect of regional 
autonomy. Successfully fielding adat as a legal source of rights thus is not 
impossible, but it requires a careful and mediated approach that at times is 
reminiscent of New Order policies.  
The reputation of Dayak throughout Kalimantan has been substantiated by 
the ousting of the Madurese. To non-Dayak Indonesians, Dayak have shown 
themselves to be capable of uniting in order to defend their interests. A 
worrisome thought for the diverse migrant population of Kalimantan. Yet 
havoc is not what the Dayak are after. Both the DADK and the PDKT aspire to 
the role of intermediaries capable of bringing Dayak grievances to the attention 
of powerful officials before actual unrest has place. Both organisations 
emphasize the place of Dayak within the nation, and present the Dayak as 
Indonesian citizens who have been wronged by the previous New Order regime 
that gave away their lands to the criminal and violent Madurese.17 To Dayak 
spokespersons, seeking legal satisfaction from the wrongs suffered from the 
regime and at the hands of the Madurese, the removal of the corrupt regime was 
an opportunity to remedy the situation.  
                                                                                                                                
 
 http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/ 
17  Perceptions of Madurese as rude and violent people exist throughout Indonesia. A 
frequently poorly educated group that mainly engages in poorly-paid manual labour, 
the Madurese are overrepresented in crime, violent or otherwise, and shunned by 
large parts of society.  
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However, both organisations are very much part of 21st century regional 
politics. They carefully operate on the thin line between legal and illegal and 
claim their authority from a source – adat – that is beyond the control of the 
government. Both have strong links to government authorities, and both 
carefully undermine the other’s popular credibility. The young Dayak 
protesting against the PDKT, for instance, largely joined the DADK which in 
turn established links with government officials. Neither organisation will go as 
far as to block agreement when negotiating over government plans for adat 
land, but each ensure to keep the notion of Dayak violence glowing. As a result, 
many Kalimantan regional governments are susceptible to Dayak desires and 
have accepted the presentation of the dispelling of the Madurese as just and 
legal.18 The validity of Dayak adat norms thus gained an important foothold in 
official law. As yet, no government authority has publicly disputed the 
organisations’ claims to represent the Dayak communities. Dayak division is no 
secret and easily determined. An informed hypothesis is that government ties 
into these organisations go deeper than either is prepared to admit. As long as 
the government deals with these organisations as representing ‘the Dayak’, 
other candidates for that position will have a tough time getting their foot in.  
Concluding Remarks 
The arguments brought forward to sustain the recognition of Dayak adat rights 
are complex and rich. Claiming indigenous Dayak rights referring to violent 
potential rather than the international indigenous peoples’ discourse, the legal 
status of which is poor at best in Indonesia, is a strategic success. Dayak 
representatives use a discourse of Dayak as Indonesian citizens who have been 
wronged during the New Order and demand redress in this era of reform. 
Redress is however not requested from the faceless and remote central 
government, but from the regional officials; the ‘politician next door’. These 
officials are susceptible to public pressure and with the Dayak’s fearsome 
reputation in mind, likely to pay attention. Mobilising Dayak ethnicity may 
bring Dayak influence to bear in official regional legislation. In this way Dayak 
adat rights can gain official support, either in practice or as official legislation. 
The strategy has three major drawbacks. First, it depends at least in part on 
the Dayak’s fierce reputation, hardly an association suitable to wronged 
national citizens and one reminiscent of New Order coercion techniques. The 
strategy thus could make the organisations vulnerable to accusations of 
extortion and illegal use of force. Second, the strategy requires the various 
Dayak groups to present a united front to the rest of society, which internal 
strife threatens to make impossible. Dayak are not one ethnic group, and never 
have been. Individuals as well as whole communities may well feel that the 
violent image or the various organisations’ leaders are at odds with their 
                                                          
 
18  To this day, no Dayak have been prosecuted for the fights or the killing of 
Madurese, even though a fair amount of photographic and filmed material is 
available that could be used in identifying individuals. 
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interests. Whether the successful application of this strategy will continue thus 
remains to be seen. Third, close ties with local government ensure influence but 
make the organisations vulnerable to accusations of collusion and 
patrimonialism which are heavily associated with the New Order regime. Even 
if they have provided inroads into government, they can work havoc on the 
grassroots support base. In case of serious conflict government could challenge 
the Dayak organisations’ legitimacy on these grounds.  
This does however not imply that the drive for the recognition of Dayak 
adat rights was unsuccessful. Looking at the wider effects beyond the threat of 
violence the broadly themed politicization of Dayak identity – including adat, 
nationalism, official law and indigeneity – has created inroads into government 
and Kalimantese society that will be difficult – but not impossible – to undo. 
Besides as potentially violent and dangerous warriors, Dayak have presented 
themselves to the outside world as the discussion partner of national presidents, 
as the unifiers of Kalimantan’s indigenous groups and – notably for the latter – 
as the actors who opened government eyes to local adat.  
The Dayak discourse of indigeneity managed to penetrate into regional and 
provincial governments. These levels are well-removed from the central 
government, accessible to grassroots influence and maintain a strong level of 
administrative autonomy. The result is a local political sustenance of a coexist-
ence of adat and official law that is nowhere in the books, but that is locally 
considered as the embodiment of Indonesia’s reform since the state and its 
rulers now take local interests into account.  
What sets this result apart from other attempts is that this coalescence of 
state law and local norms works because of a careful blend of similarities and 
differences. Dayak are Indonesian citizens and formulate their claims and 
statements largely within the discourse of Indonesian legitimacy. They are 
modern, educated and politically conscious. It took machetes and guns to claim 
traditional rights, but it takes a modern education and a strong political 
consciousness to get actual recognition. 
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